ng me to approve; when I discussed it with him after I left the White House and he was secretary of state, Powell said he would not have approved an operation like that one unless it was conducted at night. But we hadnt discussed that, nor apparently had anyone else imposed any parameters on General Garrisons range of options. Colin Powell had retired three days before the raid and John Shalikashvili had not yet been confirmed as his replacement. The operation was not approved by General Hoar at CentCom or by the Pentagon. As a result, instead of [url=http://www.kurtkizimowepolskasklep.pl/]kurtki moncler[/url] authorizing an aggressive police operation, I had authorized a military assault in hostile territory.
In a handwritten letter to me the day after the fight, General Garrison took full responsibility for his decision to go forward with the raid, outlining his reasons for the decision: the intelligence was excellent; the force was experienced; the capacity of the enemy [url=http://www.sevices-plaisirs.com/]Buty Converse[/url] was known; the tactics were appropriate; planning for contingencies had been done; an armored reaction force would have helped, but might not have reduced U.S. casualties, because the task-force troops would not leave behind their fallen comrades, one of whom was pinned in the wreckage of his helicopter. Garrison closed his letter by saying, The Mission was a success. Targeted individuals were captured and extracted from the target. . . . [url=http://www.billigalcvaskor.eu/]billiga lc vaskor[/url] President Clinton and Secretary Aspin need to be taken off the blame line.
I respected Garrison and agreed with his letter, except for the last point. There was no way I could, or should, be taken off the blame line. I believe the raid was a mistake, because carrying it out in the daytime underestimated the strength and determination of Aidids forces and the attendant possibility of losing one or more of the helicopters. In wartime, the risks would have been acceptable. On a peacekeeping mission, they were not, because the value of the prize was not worth the risk of significant casualties and the certain consequences of changing the nature of our mission in the eyes
